China Has a Point About America's AI Slowdown
China is right to challenge a slowdown plan designed partly to preserve America's AI lead. The alternative should be reciprocal safety limits and independent inspections, binding Chinese labs too.
Vincent Jiangtwo-minute read
Beijing answers back
Guo Jiakun was asked on September 14 about American AI bosses seeking a slower frontier. He attacked fearmongering and called for cooperation.1,2 That official answer announced neither acceptance of a slowdown nor rejection of every possible agreement.
Preserve whose advantage?
On September 12, Anthropic's$350B — Anthropic, private, latest valuation $350B Dario Amodei proposed pacing capability gains and admitting outside evaluators. OpenAI's$1.18T — OpenAI, private, latest valuation $1.18T Sam Altman backed pacing and promised comparable access.3
Amodei also urged tougher controls on chips and unauthorized copying of model capabilities to preserve the American lead.4 His plan asks China to cooperate with countries trying to hold it back.
Washington can argue for export controls on national security grounds. It should defend those controls separately from a claim to represent everyone's safety.
Safety has two meanings
China's state-backed newspaper framed the proposal as containment.5 That is an editorial position, not binding policy or a statement from Chinese AI companies.
Separately, state security minister Chen Yixin urged faster construction of AI risk-prevention systems in an essay published September 13.8 Beijing can oppose America's terms while acknowledging the danger.
The lead keeps moving
The size of that lead also changes. Stanford recorded the top U.S. model just 5 Arena points ahead of China's best in February 2025. By March 2026, the gap was 39 points.6,7

Neither snapshot establishes how much either country could safely slow.
China's May guidelines called for users to retain final authority over AI agents and for developers to strengthen intervention controls.9,11 Those provisions do not establish effective enforcement.
Opening the labs would matter
Amodei's strongest case is that safeguards need time to catch up. He warned of potentially catastrophic cyber harm within six to twelve months, a forecast rather than an established timetable.10
Outside evaluator access is a concrete commitment; international pacing remains a proposal.3,10 Beijing's criticism does not excuse Chinese labs from scrutiny. Their systems should face the same capability tests and disclosure rules as American ones.
Who opens the lab?
At Xi Jinping and Donald Trump's planned September 24 summit, watch for reciprocal testing access and shared safety thresholds.5 The commercial costs of pacing matter; governments must first negotiate whose capabilities would be limited.
Safety rules should bind the leader as tightly as the challenger.
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